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 Explaining Right-Wing Violence in Germany: A
 Time Series Analysis*
 Lauren M. McLaren, Bilkent University
 Objective . Although some research exists on the relationship between the econ-
 omy, foreigners, and support for right-wing parties, the effect of the economy and
 foreigners on instances of right-wing violence in Germany has not yet been ex-
 plored. The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of the relationships
 between these variables. Methods . Data were obtained from the German govern-
 ment on the number of instances of right-wing violence, the number of foreigners,
 and unemployment, and simple OLS was performed after correcting for minor time
 series problems. Results . The findings indicated that the relationship between
 the economy and acts of right-wing violence is not simple, but is moderated by the
 change in the number of foreigners. Specifically, increasing unemployment has little
 or no effect on the change in right-wing violence, unless the number of foreigners
 in the country is also on the rise. Conclusions . While a declining economy may cre-
 ate psychological and physical hardship for individuals, at the aggregate level, a
 country's economic difficulties will not necessarily result in violence against out-
 groups. Thus, solving economic problems will not likely reduce right-wing
 violence, and instead, governments need to emphasize reducing the hostility toward
 immigrants and other outgroups by focusing on the root causes of this hostility,
 which do not appear to be economic in nature.
 Beginning in 1991, instances of attacks on foreigners, their property, and
 their residences in Germany captured the world's attention. Ranging from
 firebombings of apartment buildings resulting in the deaths of foreigners to
 beatings of foreigners, the acts seemed atrocious and unprecedented.
 Indeed, between 1990 and 1991, the numbers of attacks on foreigners
 quintupled, increasing from about 300 to close to 1,500. While much of
 the postunification violence began in the eastern part of Germany, it spread
 quickly to western Germany (see Bade, 1994: 85, 92). The estimate of the
 vice president for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
 was that approximately 60 percent of the violence occurred in the former
 * Direct all correspondence to Lauren M. McLaren, Department of Political Science and
 Public Administration, Bilkent University, 06533 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey. For purposes of
 replication only, the data are available from the author. The author would like to thank Mark
 Franklin, Susan Scarrow, Wesley Chapin, Vanessa Baird, Shoon Murray, and two anonymous
 reviewers for their many helpful comments on this paper, and Sybille Reinke De Buitrago for
 assistance with the translation of documents. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the
 author. Editor's note: Reviewers were Wesley D. Chapin and Todd Sandler.
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 western länder, while the rest occurred in the five former eastern länder
 (Tuttle, 1994: 67). Thus, the problem of right-wing violence affected the
 entire country.1
 Extraordinary social changes occurring in Germany at this time may
 have provoked such an enormous increase in attacks. First, German reuni-
 fication meant that citizens in the east were under pressure to adapt to a
 new economic and political system, and in the process were forced to give
 up the economic security of the communist system (see Bade, 1994, for a
 discussion of the "psychosocial" problems accompanying reunification).
 Citizens in the western part of the country came to realize what a huge
 cost reunification might mean to them, especially in terms of the possibil-
 ity for raised taxes and lost jobs. Individuals in both parts of the country
 were suddenly faced, once again, with questions about German identity
 that had not been adequately addressed after World War II (see Tuttle,
 1994, for a discussion of the effect of this problem on violence against
 foreigners). Thus, tremendous social upheaval and uncertainty about the
 future was one result of this historic event.
 The other important event was the collapse of communism (which, of
 course, produced the first event) and the resulting war in Yugoslavia,
 which meant that Germany, with its liberal refugee policy, was receiving
 thousands of refugees, who naturally put stress on the social and economic
 system. According to Bade, "[T]he Federal Republic has absorbed more
 immigrants annually than the two classic immigration countries, Canada
 and Australia, combined" since 1987 (1994: 89). Along with these strains
 on society, part of the provocation of violence may have been the refusal
 of leaders to openly and thoroughly discuss immigration issues and to at-
 tempt to formulate a coherent, comprehensive immigration policy.2 This
 meant that questions and conflicts were bubbling up, with no legitimate
 outlet for debate (Bade, 1994; Tuttle, 1994).
 Although these (and other) specific events may be important causes of the
 increase in right-wing violence, including attacks on foreigners, the purpose
 of this paper is to explore the systematic causes in an attempt to better ex-
 plain instances of right-wing violence in Germany. The general explanations
 of the related phenomenon, support for right-wing parties, tend to center
 around immigration and the economy (but see Tuttle, 1994). However,
 quantitatively based empirical tests of these explanations are quite rare.3
 Further, the findings at the individual level with regard to hostility toward
 immigrants, which is also related to right-wing and antiforeigner violence,
 1 A review of the New York Times articles from the period indicates that the violence was
 not concentrated in any particular city, with attacks on foreigners, their property, and Jewish
 monuments and cemeteries occurring in cities and towns across the country.
 2 This is, of course, because German leaders continued to argue that Germany is not a
 country of immigration; thus, if there is no "immigration problem" or "immigration ques-
 tion," there cannot be an immigration policy.
 3 Pia Knigge (1997) and Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz (1996, Nd.) are some of the
 few researchers who focus on cross-time analyses of right-wing extremism.
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 have been perplexingly inconsistent: sometimes the person's economic sta-
 tus matters (Quillian, 1995), and sometimes it does not (McLaren, 1996a,
 1996b); sometimes the aggregate economic situation matters (Quillian,
 1995) and sometimes it does not (McLaren, 1996a, 1996b).
 The purpose of this research, therefore, is to model the effects of fluctua-
 tions in the economy and in the numbers of foreigners on right-wing
 violence in Germany. This paper attempts to explain apparently inconsistent
 past findings with the hypothesis that poor economic conditions only pro-
 voke violence to the extent that the number of foreigners is on the increase.
 Specifically, the combination of increasing unemployment and numbers of
 foreigners should provoke larger numbers of acts of violence. The economy
 alone simply is not enough; there must be a salient group that can easily be
 scapegoated and blamed for the negative changes in the economy.
 Past Research on the Economy, Migration, and Right-Wing Extremism
 Although research specifically focusing on right-wing violence is quite lim-
 ited, many have studied right-wing extremism, especially support for
 extremist parties of the right, and this particular area of research should be
 useful for informing hypotheses about rightist violence. It is generally argued
 that increases in levels of extremism of the right can be traced to turbulence
 in society (Cotter, 1996; Betz, 1994; Zimmermann and Saalfeld, 1993; see
 also, Swank and Betz, 1996, Nd.), specifically two kinds of turbulence -
 economic upheaval and mass migrations. In one major work specifically on
 right-wing violence, the same argument is made: this form of violence ap-
 pears to be a result of threatening changes in society (Bjorgo, 1995).
 Further, fluctuations in the economy have been associated with a great
 number of political activities and attitudes. First, voting generally seems to
 respond to shifts in the economy (see Lewis-Beck, 1988, for a comprehen-
 sive comparative analysis; see also Knigge, 1997). Support for extremist
 parties is said to increase during times of increased unemployment (see
 Valen, 1990, for a discussion of the relationship between unemployment
 and right-wing voting in Norway). Thus, individuals who operate through
 the accepted democratic channels (i.e., the voting booth) are likely to take
 their anger about the economy out on incumbent parties. Second, levels of
 postmaterialism - the preference for protecting freedom of speech and
 giving people a say in government decisions - also fluctuate with the econ-
 omy (Inglehart, 1990; Clarke and Dutt, 1991; Duch and Taylor, 1993).
 Individuals care less about protecting such values and more about order
 and the economy when the economy takes a nosedive. Third, and perhaps
 most alarming, levels of satisfaction with democracy appear to fluctuate
 with the economy (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg, 1993). People in industri-
 alized democracies become significantly less satisfied with democracy in
 general when the economy is bad.
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 Clearly the economy is important in determining people's attitudes and
 behaviors, and there are specific reasons that the economy may affect lev-
 els of right-wing violence: People simply become angry about the economic
 situation and act on this anger violently. While it is well established that
 the economy affects the rational and legal behaviors of individuals, the
 question that will be answered here is: Does a bad economy contribute to
 such extreme behaviors as right-wing violence? As the former president of
 the European Parliament, Enrique Baron Crespo, argues, both racism and
 xenophobia are rooted "in the fear and insecurity of the individual facing
 the future"; they found "nourishment in unemployment and poverty"
 (Betz, 1994). It seems that right-wing violence must, at least in part, stem
 from these feelings of threat that result from a bad economy.4
 The other primary reason given for greater levels of support for the right
 is an increase in the numbers of foreigners (Knigge, 1997; Swank and Betz,
 1996, Nd.; Betz, 1994; Zimmermann and Saalfeld, 1993; Husbands,
 1992). Even in Norway (which is not often considered a country with an
 "immigration problem") preliminary electoral analyses indicate that in re-
 gions where immigration is relatively high, there is increased support for
 the extreme right wing party, the Progress Party (see Valen, 1990).
 Furthermore, it has been found that in regions of the Netherlands where
 there are a higher number of Turks and Moroccans, there is also a higher
 percentage of the vote going to extreme right wing parties (see Husbands,
 1992). More recent, pooled cross-sectional time series analyses have also
 found that throughout Western Europe, higher levels of immigration are
 associated with greater support for right-wing extremist parties (Knigge,
 1997; Swank and Betz, 1996, Nd.; Cotter, 1996). More sophisticated
 analyses reveal that support for the right is higher in locations where more
 crimes are committed by immigrants (Chapin, 1997b).
 Among individual-level studies, the concentration of immigrants in a
 person's environment has been conceptualized as providing a threat to that
 person, making him or her more hostile to immigrants generally. Findings
 indicate that individuals are indeed more hostile when the concentration of
 immigrants is high (Quillian, 1995; McLaren, 1996b). Does this necessar-
 ily mean that rightist violence will also be on the rise when immigration
 becomes more pronounced?
 Part of the reason that immigration may be associated with right-wing
 extremism is that in bad economic times, immigrants become scapegoats
 and get blamed for the bad economic situation (Betz, 1994; Lewis-Beck
 and Mitchell, 1993).5 Immigrants are accused of other specific problems,
 4 It should be noted that the author is not attempting to show that unemployed individuals
 are necessarily committing acts of right-wing violence. Indeed, research on the topic indicates
 otherwise (see Bjorgo, 1995). However, a bad economy is likely to provide the stimulus that
 provokes criminal activity generally (Chapin, 1997a) and, more specifically, crimes against
 foreigners.
 3 German specialists may hear alarm bells when I use the term " migration " or "immigra-
 tion" because they react from the perspective of official German policy, which has been that
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 too, like crime, urban decay, housing shortages, and a general national de-
 cline (Betz, 1994; Chapin, 1997a). As Hollifield (1994a, 1994b) argues, by
 the mid-1980s, foreigners were being blamed for taking jobs, housing, and
 public services away from German citizens.
 It should be noted that the arguments presented above point to the
 possibility of something other than a simple, additive linear model.
 Specifically, it was argued that in bad economic times, individuals may
 become angry and use immigrants as scapegoats. This implies that immi-
 grants must be a large enough group, or must be visible enough, to provide
 a clear scapegoat target. Thus, it is possible that a better specification of
 the relationship between the economy, immigration, and violence is multi-
 plicative. The hypothesis, therefore, is that the combination of high
 immigration with a bad economy is likely to stimulate much more violence
 than a bad economy or high immigration taken individually. Indeed,
 Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1993) find that aggregate-level unemployment,
 when considered by itself, has almost no effect on voting for the French
 National Front (the extremist right-wing party). Instead, the combination
 of high unemployment and a large number of foreigners is key to produc-
 ing increased support for right-wing parties. Swank and Betz (Nd.) also
 find little evidence to support the notion that aggregate unemployment
 is related to support for extreme right-wing parties, but do find support
 for an interaction between immigration and unemployment. Again, this
 process seems to accurately explain the more legitimate forms of outgroup
 (anti-immigrant) hostility. However, does the relationship hold in the more
 extreme forms of hostility, namely right-wing violence? A qualitative
 analysis of the rise of right-wing extremism in Germany in the 1990s indi-
 cates that one of the important elements in these events was indeed the
 combination of high unemployment and the sudden massive influx of for-
 eigners. As Watson argues, by 1992 "unemployment and immigration had
 converged to create laboratory conditions for the growth of xenophobia"
 (1993: 10). The implication of this analysis is that when the increase in the
 number of foreigners is relatively low and the economy is in good shape,
 right-wing violence should not be on the increase. The conditions of
 relatively high unemployment and increased immigration are the circum-
 stances under which violence by the right starts to rise.
 Analyses of the perpetrators of right-wing violence support this theory
 by indicating that the majority of these individuals are in economic posi-
 tions that give them a propensity to become violently hostile toward
 foreigners. Willems (1995) reviews German police records from 1991 to
 1994 and finds that beyond the pure "right-wing activist" - who appears
 "Germany is not a country of immigration." The author recognizes that this has been official
 policy, but takes the perspective of many immigration specialists, which is that such a state-
 ment is utterly ridiculous - Germany may not wish to be a country of immigration, but it, in
 fact, is one (Esser and Korte, 1985; Martin, 1994).
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 to be completely motivated by right-wing ideology - the "ethnocentric
 youth" and the "criminal youth" make up the bulk of the perpetrators.
 These latter two groups consist of individuals who subscribe to some de-
 gree to right-wing ideology, especially racism and xenophobia, but are also
 likely to be motivated by threat because they do not have extensive job
 training and they do experience periodic unemployment problems.6
 Data and Measures
 Before discussing the measurement of the variables in the model, the
 meaning of right-wing violence should be clarified. The author here draws
 on the definition of right-wing extremism offered by Bjergo, which is taken
 from Heitmeyer's research: Right-wing extremism is "an ideology of con-
 sidering inequality between people as a nature-given principle, combined
 with an acceptance of violence as a legitimate way of acting" (Bjorgo,
 1995). Thus, right-wing violence is violence committed by individuals who
 subscribe to this ideology; the specific acts include arson, attacks on per-
 sons and property, bombings, and murder.
 The numbers of instances of right-wing violence were gleaned from the
 yearly reports by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, entitled Verfassungs-
 schutzberichte , or Reports of the Office of Constitutional Protection, for
 the years 1971-92. Estimates for 1993, 1994, and 1995 were acquired
 from the German government's home page,7 which reports the same in-
 formation that appears in the Verfassungsschutzberichte . The German
 government attempts to keep an accurate record of the activities of ex-
 tremist groups, both on the left and right, and reports summaries of acts
 that are fairly certain to have been committed by these groups. Fortunately,
 the report separates the acts of violence on the left from acts of violence on
 the right. These acts of violence include a whole range of activities: mur-
 der, assault, bombings, arson, and attacks against possessions. When an
 act of violence is determined to have been committed by someone sub-
 scribing to right-wing ideology, it appears as such in the report.8
 6 It should be noted that the other typologies developed by Willems (based on police re-
 ports) indicate that a large minority (perhaps 40-45 percent) of perpetrators do not belong to
 a group that is economically motivated by threat. As mentioned above, approximately 15 per-
 cent of the perpetrators appear to be ideologically motivated, and tend to have fairly
 successful jobs and good educations. Another 25-30 percent, referred to as the "fellow trav-
 ellers, w is motivated neither by ideology nor by economic threat, but more by peer pressure
 and "the desire to prove oneself in front of friends or not to leave them in the lurch"
 (Willems, 1995: 173). Thus, the violence tends to be started by those who are economically
 or ideologically motivated, with the "fellow travellers" coming along for the ride.
 7 http://www.germany-info.org.
 8 The reports are based on police investigations of crimes. Police departments, while con-
 ducting their investigations, often will determine that crimes were committed by certain types
 of groups and this information is included in the investigators' final reports; the federal
 government then simply compiles the final statistics on acts of violence (and crime in general)
 in a yearly report.
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 FIGURE 1
 Right-Wing Violence, 1971-1995
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 Figure 1 displays the numbers of acts of violence across 1971-95. As il-
 lustrated in Figure 1, the numbers of instances of violence prior to
 unification show seemingly small fluctuations, but after reunification, these
 numbers dramatically increase. To control for the possibility that this part
 of the series (post-unification) is contributing overwhelmingly to the find-
 ings, a unification dummy variable will be included in the regression
 below. Also, both qualitative analyses (Willems, 1995) and inspection of
 the data make it clear that 1991 was an extraordinary year in terms of
 right-wing violence. This was the year following unification, and in order
 to try to capture the turbulence of the year, an additional dummy variable
 representing 1991 will be included.
 The high degree of violence during reunification makes it appear as if
 right-wing violence prior to this time varied little. Figure 2, however,
 shows that there was indeed large variation, with the instances of right-
 wing violence ranging from around 20 to almost 120 per year.9
 These data are certainly not without problems. One of the problems is that only reported
 crimes are included; thus, any crime that has gone unreported will not be included. A second
 problem is that the various police precincts use different criteria for determining whether a
 crime is "right-wing," meaning that reporting across parts of Germany may be inconsistent
 (Willems, 1995: 164). The result is that in some precincts, it is assumed that attacks on for-
 eigners, homosexuals and other outgroups are the work of right-wing extremists, and in other
 precincts there is more of an attempt to ascertain the ideology of the perpetrator. However,
 since these differences should remain constant, these statistics should yield valid measures of
 change in right-wing violence across time.
 9 As indicated in note 16 below, the analysis was conducted for the entire series and for the
 preunification years only, and the relationships reported below hold for both series.
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 14:22:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Right-Wing Violence in Germany 173
 FIGURE 2
 Right Wing Violence, 1971-1989
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 Turning to the independent variables, it should first be noted that the
 term "foreigner ," when used in the German context, has a fairly clear, spe-
 cific meaning. Generally, individuals who are not of German descent and
 who reside in Germany are considered "foreigners." Thus, a guest worker
 who has been in the country for twenty years, for example, unless he/she
 has gone through a very lengthy and difficult naturalization process, is still
 counted as a "foreigner." On the other hand, individuals entering the
 country from Poland, the former Soviet Union, etc., who can show that
 they are "of German blood" are not counted as foreigners. In general, in-
 dividuals who have German heritage are not foreigners; individuals who
 cannot illustrate German heritage are foreigners.10
 The numbers of foreigners during 1971-93 come from Bericht der
 Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer die Lage
 der Ausländer in der BRD : 1994 (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 1994:
 Ch. 6). I obtained the numbers of foreigners in 1994 and 1995 from
 the German government home page.11 These statistics are displayed in
 Figure 3. As might be expected, based on qualitative research and news
 accounts, the period in which there was a tremendous increase in right-
 wing violence coincides with the period in which there was an increase in
 the number of foreigners.
 10 Some might even argue that it is this conceptualization of "foreigner" and German citi-
 zenship that contributes to xenophobia and right-wing violence.
 1 1 http://www.germany-info.org.
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 14:22:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 174 Social Science Quarterly
 FIGURE 3
 Foreign Population, 1971-1995
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 The economic indicator chosen for this study is the unemployment rate,
 which is the one important economic indicator normally mentioned in con-
 junction with immigration and right-wing extremism; the measure is from
 the Yearbook of Labor Statistics and is displayed in Figure 4. 12 Any po-
 tential relationship between unemployment and right-wing violence is
 fairly unclear from this figure because unemployment had already been on
 the rise, starting in the mid-1980s, then dropped in 1991 (the most inten-
 sive year for right-wing violence) only to rise again shortly thereafter.
 Thus, there is already some support for the notion that unemployment,
 if it is important at all, is probably not the sole trigger for right-wing
 violence.13
 12 Inflation was also considered. However, it is not normally a specific problem associated
 with right-wing extremism, and it was so highly collinear with unemployment that the re-
 gression results were uninterpretable. Further, with the inclusion of the interaction term, an
 even greater potential for multicollinearity problems exists. Thus, unemployment will be the
 sole measure of the economic situation.
 13 The descriptive statistics for the key variables in the regression below are:
 Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum N
 Right-Wing Violence 425.65 726.57 10.00 2,639.00 25
 (number of acts)
 Foreign Population 4,784.84 1,123.77 3,438.70 7,342.80 25
 (1000s)
 Unemployment 6.28 2.98 .80 10.80 25
 (percent)
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 FIGURE 4
 Unemployment Rates, 1971-1995
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 Analysis
 One problem that arose in analyzing these data is a fairly common prob-
 lem with any time series analysis: nonstationarity in one of the series. Based
 on the Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for each of the series, only the dependent
 variable displayed nonstationarity.14 Under the circumstances, the usual so-
 lution is to difference the nonstationary series. However, this corrective
 would mean that levels of unemployment and foreigners would produce
 change in right-wing violence. Because this is theoretically unappealing and
 difficult to analyze conceptually, and because the hypotheses stated above
 are in terms of the relative number of foreigners and relative unemployment,
 I differenced all of the variables. Thus, the regression estimates focus on the
 change in levels of the dependent and independent variables. Recall that
 dummy variables will also be included to control for reunification and
 specifically for the year 1991. Thus, the estimated equation is:
 A Violence = bo + bi (A Unemployment) + b2 (A Number Foreign)
 + b3 (A Number Foreign*A Unemployment)
 + b4 (Reunification Dummy) + b5 (1991 Dummy)
 + e. (1)
 The results from the regression are displayed in Table 1.
 14 The Dickey-Fuller statistics (followed by i-values in parentheses) are: Right-Wing
 Violence, -15.63 (-2.63); Foreign Population, -0.19 (-0.06); Unemploymen , -4.77
 (-1.60).
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 14:22:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 176 Social Science Quarterly
 TABLE 1
 OLS Estimates for A Right-Wing Violence
 Variables Model 1 Model 2
 Aunemployment 24.35 -46.14
 (64.14) (59.00)
 Aforeigners .54** .42*
 (-27) (.23)
 Reunification dummy 93.41 -361.86
 (232.41) (250.50)
 1991 dummy 869.56** 1,649.46**
 (328.78) (386.27)
 Aunemployment * Aforeigners .77**
 (.27)
 Constant -48.54 2.87
 (67.73) (59.43)
 Adjusted R2 .54 .68
 SEE 243.49 203.76
n 23 3
 Durbin Watson 2.30 2.002
 Notes: Figures in cells are b, followed by standard errors printed below in parentheses;
 * p < .10, ** p < .05.
 Surprisingly, unemployment has no significant effect in Model 1. In the
 linear, additive model, the change in the number of foreigners contributes
 significantly to explaining changes in the levels of right-wing violence, but
 change in unemployment does not.
 Recall, however, that the general argument about the effect of the econ-
 omy is that a worsening economy is associated with anger and hostility
 about the economic situation, which is often taken out on outgroups, who
 are made the scapegoats for economic problems. This implies that such a
 scapegoat must be salient enough to receive the general wrath of extrem-
 ists. This multiplicative hypothesis has yet to be tested. The expectation
 for this hypothesis is that when there is rising unemployment and increas-
 ing numbers of foreigners, violence will be at its highest; when neither
 unemployment nor the number of foreigners is increasing, or when un-
 employment is increasing and the number of foreigners is not, violence will
 be much lower. When both variables register little change, the degree of
 violence will be on the decline.
 The results indicate that the interactive specification performs much bet-
 ter than the linear specification (see Model 2). Specifically, the interaction
 contributes a nontrivial 0.14 to the variance explained, with a slope coef-
 ficient that is highly significant, statistically.15
 15Collinearity diagnostics (tolerance and variance inflation factors) indicate that multi-
 collinearity is not a problem, despite the inclusion of the interaction term. It should be noted
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 14:22:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Right-Wing Violence in Germany 177
 FIGURE 5
 Interactive Effect of Unemployment and Foreigners
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 What do the coefficients tell us about the nature of the relationship?16
 The best way to determine this is to substitute values from the original
 data set to see how the slope is affected by the moderating variable
 (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). Low, medium, and high scores were se-
 lected for both cha ge in unemployment and the change in the numbers of
 foreigners.17 As seen in Figure 5, the slope for unemployment does indeed
 chan e depending o  the n mber of foreigners. When the change i  the
 number of foreigners in the country is negative (below average), the slope
 for the relationship between unemployment and instances of right-wing vi-
 olence is actually negative. I  other words, increases in unemployment
 produce less viole ce when there is a decreasing number of foreigners.
 When the change in foreigners is average, the relationship betwee  un-
 employment is slight but positive. Stated differently, w en the change in
 the number of foreigners in the country is small but positive, rig t-wing
 that the R2 indicates that the model generally performs well; cross-time models containing
 variables that have been difference  normally have a relatively low variance explained (in the
 0.30-0.35 range).
 16 It is important to note that the equation was reestimated for the preunification years (the
 years prior to 1990), and a similar relationship was discovered. The primary difference is that
 the relationship was ot quite as strong in these years as it is in the entire series. However,
 t is reestimation makes it clear that the relationship does indeed hold even prior to reunifi-
 cation.
 17 The medium value for each distribution is the mean, and the high and low values are one
 standard deviation above the mean and one standard deviation below the mean, respectively.
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 violence increases slightly as unemployment increases. Finally, when the
 change in foreigners is large and positive, increases in unemployment pro-
 duce a much larger increase in acts of violence. Thus, it appears that only
 when a clear scapegoat (like increasing numbers of foreigners) exists does
 a bad economy manifest itself in violence by the right. This is quite con-
 sistent with the findings of Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1993), where voting
 for the FN (National Front) in France was dependent upon this interaction
 between unemployment and immigration. The combination of their find-
 ings with those in the current study provide very strong evidence that, in
 contrast to the arguments made in much of the immigration literature, a
 bad economy is not the primary stimulus necessary for right-wing extrem-
 ist behavior, but the interaction of a bad economy and immigration is quite
 powerful in predicting such behavior, whether this behavior is legitimate
 (i.e., voting) or not (i.e., carrying out violent acts).
 Conclusions
 This analysis began by asking what effect the economy and the number
 of foreigners have on instances of right-wing violence in Germany. This
 question was motivated partly by the lack of such studies in the past and
 by the inconsistencies of studies conducted at the individual level, par-
 ticularly with regard to the effects of the economy on hostility toward
 immigrants. The answers to these questions are intriguing.
 First the economic variable appeared insignificant. In the linear, additive
 model, unemployment seemed to make no difference in the instances of vi-
 olence. However, upon further investigation, the economy - specifically
 rising unemployment - did seem to matter, but only in combination with
 increases in the size of an outgroup at whom violence could be directed.
 That outgroup here was foreigners. Thus, as the number of foreigners in-
 creases, so too does the effect of unemployment on the numbers of acts of
 violence. The question then becomes: What would happen if the economic
 situation was to worsen but there was no clear target group? The results
 here indicate that the number of acts of violence would have remained
 fairly steady, with no such dramatic increases. On the other hand, another
 outgroup might have become the focus of such attacks.
 The next logical step in the study of right-wing violence would be an at-
 tempt to better understand the link between the economy, foreigners, and
 violence, expanding on the existing studies of perpetrators of right-wing vi-
 olence. This paper has established that the three variables interact, but the
 reason for the interaction needs to be discovered. Are the people commit-
 ting the violence directly affected by the economy? Have they lost their
 own jobs recently? Alternatively, do they have reason to fear the future loss
 of employment? Or, are they using the economic downturn as an excuse to
 play out violent tendencies? An answer to these questions might make it
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 possible to design public policies that would reduce the incidence of right-
 wing violence.
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